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Abstract
In this contribution, at rst, we introduce a basic network framework to study pyramidal struc-
tures and wedges between ownership and control of companies. Then, we apply it to a dataset of
53.5 million of companies operating in 208 countries. Among others, we detect a strong concentra-
tion of corporate power, as less than 1% of parent companies collect more than 100 subsidiaries, but
they are responsible for more than 50% of global sales. Therefore, we show that the role of indirect
control, i.e., through middlemen subsidiaries, is relevant in 15% of domestic and 54% of foreign
subsidiaries. Among foreign companies, cases emerge of blurring nationality, when control paths
cross more than one national border, in the presence of multiple passports (19.1%), indirectly for-
eign (24.5%), and round-tripping subsidiaries (1.33%). Finally, we relate indirect control strategies
to country indicators of the institutional environment. We nd that pyramidal structures arise less
likely in the presence of good nancial and contractual institutions in the parents country, as these
foster more transparent forms of corporate governance. Instead, parent companies choose indirect
control through countries of subsidiaries that have better nancial institutions, possibly because it
is easier to coordinate decisions from remote. Finally, we nd that o¤shore nancial centers are
preferred jurisdictions for middlemen subsidiaries, probably due to a lower taxation and a lack of
nancial disclosure.
Keywords: ownership, corporate control, multinational enterprises, 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institutions, o¤shore, economic entrenchment
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1 Introduction
In 2016, according to the Fortune magazines ranking, top 500 global companies employed about
67 million people worldwide, generating 27.7 trillion US dollars of consolidated revenues. In the
same year, cross-border mergers and takeovers amounted to 869 trillion US dollars, showing a rising
trend over the latest ve years (UNCTAD, 2017). Despite di¤erent national frameworks for corporate
governance, the ownership of rms and the market for corporate control are by now global activities,
with a propensity to shift from models of dispersed ownership to models of concentrated ownership
(OECD, 2017).
In fact, a governance based on concentrated ownership contradicts the epitome of a modern corpo-
ration, once sketched in the seminal work by Berle and Means (1932; 1967), with widely held capital
shares and small shareholders relying on accountable professional managers. Nothing new under the
sun, since La Porta et al. (1999) have shown how one or more shareholders can have voting rights
signicantly in excess of cash ow rights, mainly through indirect control gained over pyramidal own-
ership structures.
More recently, Levy and Szafarz (2017) studied how cross-ownership linkages may also allow man-
agers (not shareholders) to seize indirect voting rights, hence insulating their rms from outside
shareholders. They discuss how cross-ownership is nowadays a phenomenon that can be found both
in civil law countries and, for example, in the US mutual fund industry.
Whether indirect voting rights are seized by ultimate shareholders or by managers, pyramidal
structures and cross-ownership pave the way for a concentration of economic power by few, who
do not make a commensurate capital investment, hence endangering innovation rates, allocation of
nancial resources, and economic growth (Morck et al., 2005).
Briey, ownership and corporate control of companies may be separated. The phenomenon has
been studied both theoretically and empirically (Mathews, 2007; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Faccio
and Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Fama and Jensen, 1983), often concerning
the institutional environments of the origin countries. However, previous works often relied on few
albeit representative case studies, as in La Porta et al. (1999), or on a geographic subset of quoted
rms, as in Faccio and Lang (2002). Thankfully, an increasing availability of data on shareholding
activity allows for a more systematic study of corporate control structures on a global scale.
In this contribution, at rst, we propose a simple network perspective to tackle with the separation
between ownership and control in pyramidal structures, which is exible enough to describe the design
of di¤erent corporate structures around the world. Therefore, we apply our network framework to a
unique dataset of about 53.5 million of companies active in 208 countries in 2015. In this way, we
provide for the rst time an overall assessment of indirect control through fragmentation/concentration
of voting rights, within and across national borders. Finally, we empirically relate the emergence
of indirect control to the quality of country level institutions, controlling for political and physical
geographic characteristics of origin and destination countries of investment operations.
We build on previous literature when we introduce our network framework, which considers the
concentration, the transitivity and the consolidation of voting rights in webs of interlocking assemblies
of shareholders (Levy and Szafarz, 2017; Levy, 2011; Chapelle and Szafarz, 2007; Crama and Leruth,
2007). However, our purpose is to extract corporate control structures from original shareholding
activity, whereas previous works intended to study the corporate power of agents within already
assigned control structures. As far as we know, ours is the rst attempt to apply a big data algorithm
to global ownership of rms. Besides computational obstacles, our e¤ort required the introduction of
an abstract ownership space, which we imagine as a common playeld for every possible investor in
the share capital of rms, whose original goal is either to participate in the distribution of dividends
and/or to exert inuence on companiesmanagement decisions.
In this context, we assume that any corporate structure plunge into the ownership space. It can be
represented as a peculiar graph, i.e., a hierarchy of rms, made of a parent and its subsidiaries. In these
hierarchical graphs, a parent can coordinate the economic activity of its subsidiaries, possibly located
on di¤erent layers of control distance from the parent, through direct or indirect equity linkages. It is
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in this context that we introduce a notion of corporate control distance as the number of intermediate
middlemen subsidiaries that are needed to enforce decisions from headquarters.
In a second part, after we extract corporate control from global ownership, we unveil hidden het-
erogeneity in the design of corporate structures. First, we detect a strong concentration of economic
power by few parent companies, because only less than 1% of the total collect more than 100 sub-
sidiaries, but these are responsible for more than 50% of global sales in our data. Then, we nd
that indirect corporate control is more common than we expected, because subsidiaries of subsidiaries
represent about 15% of domestic and 54% of foreign companies.
More specically, peculiar cases emerge among foreign a¢ liates, which are relevant in the design
of competition, international investment, and taxation policies. We nd that the identication of
nationality of investors1 can be ambiguous:
i) because a company can have multiple passports, when indirect control paths cross multiple
countries, in 19.1% of our data on foreign a¢ liates;
ii) because a company can be only apparently domestic, after we look at the immediate sharehold-
ers, but it proves to be indirect foreign, once we check for upper layers in indirect control paths, in
24.5% of our data on foreign a¢ liates;
iii) because a domestic investor can use a foreign country to reinvest back in her country of origin,
hence starting a so-called round-tripping investment, possibly to exploit the advantages of a foreign
jurisdiction, in a non-negligible 1.33% of our data on foreign a¢ liates.
In a third part, we relate indirect control to indicators of geography, contractual and nancial
frictions at the country level. In fact, indirect control of subsidiaries is the original way pyramids and
vertical structures arise. We nd that nancial institutions in the countries of origin and destination
of investment are indeed drivers of indirect control, but with an opposite sign. In particular, we
nd that parent companies disregard indirect control pyramidal structures when their countries have
better nancial institutions, since the latter foster more transparent forms of corporate governance.
However, ceteris paribus, better nancial institutions in both the countries of middlemen and nal
subsidiaries increase the probability that a parent company establishes indirect control. The latter
nding is coherent with the idea that, once vertical structures are established, their operability requires
lower frictions along control paths so that management decisions can be enforced from the top of
headquarters.
Finally, we detect a role for o¤shore nancial centers as preferred jurisdictions for middlemen
subsidiaries, possibly due to their lower levels of taxation and a lack of transparency in nancial
disclosure.
To have an idea of the complexity of corporate networks we may encounter, we show two examples
extracted from our elaborations in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Microsoft Corp and the Toyota Group are
among the top 0.1% corporate networks that we detect, regarding both numbers of subsidiaries and
consolidated sales. They are also included in the ranking by Fortune Global 500. They show di¤er-
ent corporate structures, and they were born at di¤erent times. The rst is a leading IT company
in the provision of computer software and consumer electronics founded in 1975. According to our
elaborations, it collects 389 subsidiaries operating in 79 countries. The second is one of the biggest
manufacturers of motor vehicles historically organized as a Japanese keiretsu, i.e., as a conglomerate
structure with cross-shareholding exchanges among constituent rms. It was born in the 1930s, and
according to our elaborations, it collects 2,239 subsidiaries organized on top by eight di¤erent parent
companies with subsidiaries active in 125 countries. Each node in the graphs of Figure 1 and Fig-
ure 2 represents a legally autonomous rm that participates or is participated by other companies.
Individual shareholders are excluded from visualization, although they are considered when draw-
ing the boundaries of corporate control. The participations to share capital are depicted as edges
1See also UNCTAD (2016) for a discussion on the relevance of these cases, while adopting our procedure with similar
data. More in general, UNCTAD (2016) usefully discusses the policy challenges set by complex ownership and control
structures, when international investment agreements try to discriminate based on the nationality of investors.
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Figure 1: The corporate control network of Microsoft
Corporate network of Microsoft Corp visualized with a ForceAtlas2
layout (Jacomi et al., 2014) using Gephi software. A red node indicates
a parent company, while green nodes represent majority-owned
subsidiaries and blue nodes are a¢ liates controlled with a dominant
stake.
between rms. In the case of Microsoft, most of the ownership linkages run from the parent com-
pany to subsidiaries, i.e., a majority of them is directly controlled, although some organize in clusters
around Linkedin, Microsoft Mobile (former Nokia) and Skype Technologies. Indeed, these are all
former parent companies acquired over time by Microsoft together with their subsidiaries, therefore
embedded as such within the corporate hierarchy. Other clusters can be detected around Microsoft
Ireland Operations, Microsoft Round Island One, Microsoft Luxembourg International Mobile, Xbox
and Microsoft Platform Products and Services, which instead are all born inside Microsoft as nancial
or technological holdings.
In Figure 2, the Toyota Group has a more sophisticated corporate structure with patterns of
ownership often crossing each other, as we can expect in a Japanese keiretsu, where cross-holdings
are a signal of long-term reciprocal commitment among constituent rms because managers can sit
at interlocking assemblies. Exceptionally, the Toyota Group has eight di¤erent parent companies on
top of its corporate structure, each of them holds a minority albeit dominant stake in the other seven.
The latter seems not to be a standard solution in our elaborations since the greatest majority of
companies prefer to organize with just one parent on top. A separate cluster of rms is detected
around CFAO, which indeed was an autonomous group acquired by Toyota only in 2012, specialized
in the distribution of cars, consumer goods, and pharmaceutical products in African countries.
What both these corporate structures have in common is the exercise of indirect control on some
subsidiaries, which is pivotal in the design of pyramids and vertical structures. That is, some sub-
sidiaries are at a proprietary variable distance from headquarters, with some middlemen subsidiaries
interposing along the control path starting from the parent company. This is the reason why we focus
on the emergence of indirect control in our empirical investigations, as a starting point to approach
the complexity of these objects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our network framework for
ownership of companies. In Section 3 we describe the identication of corporate control networks as
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Figure 2: The corporate control network of the Toyota Group
Corporate network of the Toyota Group visualized with a ForceAtlas2
(Jacomi et al., 2014) layout using Gephi software. Red nodes indicate
(interlocked) parent companies, while green nodes represent
majority-owned subsidiaries and blue nodes are a¢ liates controlled with
a dominant stake.
a result of the concentration of voting rights on ownership networks. Section 4 describes data and
introduces rst empirical evidence. In Section 5 we discuss the empirical strategy and related results.
2 An ownership space
2.1 Ownership networks
In this section we introduce the notion of ownership space as developed by rms and their shareholders.
Ownership networks emerge because: i) companies can hold stakes in other companies and become
corporate shareholders; ii) stakes of companies can be fragmented among di¤erent (individual or
corporate) shareholders; iii) a (corporate or individual) shareholder can have a stake in more than one
company.
We can think of the ownership space as the common playeld of all investors with a stake in the
share capital of rms, whose original goal is either to participate in dividend distribution and/or to
exert inuence on companiesmanagement decisions.
Let dene an ownership space, 
, as a collection of ownership networks Gs as follows:
G (NG ; VG ;KG ;WG) 2 
 (N;V;K;W ) (1)
Each ownership network is made of: i) a set of nodes, NG , which are either companies or their
shareholders; ii) a set of equity values for nodes, VG ; iii) a set of ownership linkages running from
shareholders to companies, KG ; iv) a set of ownership weights WG (as percentages) for each ownership
linkage. The ownership space can be made of more than one ownership network, such that
[
g
G =
5

, where g is the number of separate networks. Ownership networks may di¤er along any of the
dimensions in eq. 1.
Among nodes, N , we can nd both companies (I  N) and shareholders (S  N). A company
can also become a (corporate) shareholder, such that I \ S 6= ?.
Please note that we need at least one company investing in the equity of another company to
generate an ownership network, otherwise we would end up with only a binary relationship between
a set of companies and a set of individual shareholders.2
We can identify a subset of shareholders as ultimate owners (U  S). These are the ultimate
beneciaries of ownership, which directly or indirectly take advantage of the productive activities of
companies after the distribution of prots (or losses). Among them, we can nd households or public
authorities (governmental agencies, regional agencies, states). By nature and human institutions,
the ultimate owners cannot be owned by any other entity, i.e. they are the original sources of any
ownership network. That is, any set UG  NG and UG 6= ?.
Each company i 2 I has at least one direct shareholder si sitting at the corporate assembly Si. If
the ownership of a company is fragmented, we have more than one direct shareholder, si 2 Si, such
that the corporate assembly is a subset of the total number of nodes, Si  S  N , with cardinality
jSij 2 [1; N ].
The number of shareholders jSij of the company i represents also its ownership in-degree, i.e. it
counts how many ownership linkages end in the ith company.
The number of stakes held by each shareholder represents its ownership out-degree, i.e., it counts
how many ownership linkages start from any s ending in a company.
We can now dene an ownership relationship, S : S ! I, such that an ownership linkage (k 2 K)
runs from any shareholder si to a company i. The ownership relationship is always directed, from the
shareholder to the company, since the rst holds voting rights and participates to dividends of the
latter. The amount of stake a shareholder can hold in a rm falls in a percent range wsii 2W = (0; 100].
In fact, any wsii represents the ownership weight attributed to any ownership linkage.
In turn, ownership rights are based on a distribution of equity3 at the company-level (vi 2 Vi),
such that
X
i
vi = E is the total amount of equity scattered throughout the global economy at a given
moment. We can further assume that ultimate owners have an equity value always equal to zero, since
they cannot be owned.
Eventually, the ownership space 
 is a perfect partition of all ownership networks Gs, such that[
G
NG = N , and
[
G
KG = K, but also
\
G
NG = ? and
\
G
KG = ?.
It means that in a world where ownership can be fragmented, a company does not participate to
more than one ownership network and a shareholder does not own stakes outside of its network.
Nonetheless, among the possibilities that can be realized in an ownership space, we do not exclude
the case of a unique ownership network, when all its components are possibly connected in a unique
network.
On the other hand, a single ownership network G may not be a partition on single corporate assem-
blies. Indeed,
[
i
Si has to sum up to the total number of shareholders in the ownership network, but
we may have
\
i
Si 6= ?. That is, a single shareholder (individual, state or company) can participate
to the equity of more than one rm.4
2 It is among investment operations made by companies on other companies that we will nd indirect control relation-
ships, which we will investigate more in the empirical section, because they originate pyramids and vertical structures.
3Alternatively, we can think of substituting the equity value with any other rm-level indicator, for example, size,
productivity, or nancial constraints, according to the scope of the analysis. However, keeping the equity values of
companies allows us to better frame the ownership networks as the product of decisions by investors, with an amount of
their stake.
4Fragmentation of shareholding and the presence of corporate shareholders are together the original reasons why
ownership networks may di¤er from control networks.
6
2.2 Ownership paths and ownership distance
We can now dene a notion of path and a notion of distance in the ownership space, which are pivotal
for following analyses of direct and indirect control.
In this framework, it is useful to think of any graph SG as a collection of ownership paths, running
between any of each (direct or indirect) shareholder and a company.
Given the orientation of the ownership relation, any direct shareholder is a (direct) predecessor
and any receiving company is a (direct) successor in ownership. However, there can be more than one
predecessor si+m for each company i, if si+m is an indirect shareholder whose ownership rights can be
exterted through m intermediate companies.
Let dene the ownership path as a nite sequence linking two nodes:
P
(m)
sji
= (sj ; si+m 1:::; ; si; i) (2)
where sj 2 N is a generic predecessor of company i. It can be either an ultimate owner or a
corporate shareholder. The length of any ownership path is given by m, which is equivalent to the
number of predecessors in the path. In case of a direct shareholder, the length of the path is m = 1.
In fact, alternative ownership paths of variable length may link two nodes in an ownership network.
An ownership path P (m)sji with m 6= 0 can be decomposed in m ownership paths of length 1.
Let dene now the ownership distance between two nodes as given by the length of the shortest
path (or paths) linking the two nodes in an ownership network:
dji = min
m
h
P
(m)
sji
i
(3)
The presence of cycles is a peculiarity of ownership networks, due to cross-holdings and convoluted
vertical structures. An ownership network is cyclic when it contains at least one ownership path that
departs from a (corporate) shareholder and ends back to it. In other words, each company on an
ownership cycle is at the same time a predecessor and a successor of itself.
2.3 An illustrative case of ownership network
In Figure 3 we report an illustrative case that catches all the hurdles we may encounter in an ownership
network.
Our illustrative network is made of six companies, four individuals and a state authority (eleven
nodes). Overall, fteen ownership linkages are generated, each with an ownership weight in percentage.
The ultimate sources (or owners) of the graphs, the individuals, cannot have any predecessors in
ownership. We can think of our ctional graph as extracted from a bigger ownership space, where
other ownership networks are separated. The graph is indeed a transitive closure, from and to which
no other linkage departs and arrives. That is, no companies and no shareholders are missing from the
representation of the network in Figure 3.
Let us consider the ownership relationship between shareholders and companies.
Company [1] has an assembly of shareholders that includes two corporate entities, [2] and [5], and
an individual shareholder, [a]. None of its shareholders has outright majority in the company, i.e.
each arc has a weight below 50% of voting rights. Company [1] has no successors in ownership and
it is at the bottom of any ownership path. Company [2] participates directly in the equity of two
di¤erent companies, [1] and [5], and it has three distinct shareholders,[b], [c], and [3], among which
company [3] has direct control. Company [3] has two individual shareholders, [d] and [e], who sit
in the assembly together with managers from company [5]. Company [4] is directly controlled by a
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Figure 3: A stylized ownership network with two corporate boundaries
state authority, [e], but it also holds some of its own shares in portfolio, producing a case of self-
ownership, which is reported as an arc that both starts and ends in the same company. Company
[5] has three corporate entities sitting in the assembly ([2],[3], [4]). Among them, company [3] holds
absolute majority of voting rights. Companies [5] and [3] engage in cross-holdings. Company [6] has
only one direct corporate shareholder [5].
Let us consider now a mapping of ownership paths in Figure 3.
There are about 54 possible ownership paths connecting any two nodes in the ownership network.
For example, company [1] is found at the end of 19 di¤erent paths and company [6] at the end of 15
ownership paths. They may have variable length, for example P (2)c1 = (c; 2; 1) and P
(3)
c1 = (c; 2; 5; 1)
both connect company [1] with individual shareholder [c]. There are four paths with length equal to
seven, among them for example P (7)d6 = (d; 3; 2; 5; 3; 2; 5; 6). Shortest paths are of direct ownership and
have length equal to 1, for example P (1)21 = (2; 1). Note how longer paths also contain the ownership
cycles, as for example company [2] and [5] appear as predecessors of themselves in P (7)d6 . A case of
self-ownership implies that the company is always considered as a predecessor of itself, as for example
in P (4)e6 = (e; 4; 4; 5; 6).
All ultimate owners of the network can claim a direct or indirect ownership in company [1]. The
same is not true, for example, for company [6], whose ultimate owners are in the subset fb; c; d; eg.
We can already anticipate here that the ownership network represented in Figure 3 contains only
one corporate boundaries made by a parent company and its subsidiaries, and a standing-alone rm.
It is not always the case. According to our denitions given in Appendix A: i) company [3] is the
parent company of [2], [5], [1] and [6] ; ii) company [4] is independent, because it does not belong to
any parent company. Albeit independent, company [4] has its own portfolio investment in a subsidiary
inside the corporate boundary.
Interestingly, company [6] is controlled by its parent company only indirectly through company
[5], i.e. it is a subsdiary of a subsidiary assuming transitivity in control. On the other hand, company
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[1] is controlled by its parent also after the consolidation of voting rights from rst-level subsidiaries
[2] and [5], which together sum up to an absolute majority of control (66%).
We treat systematically transitivity and consolidation of voting rights in the next section, as they
are peculiar ways to extend the outreach of parent companies.
3 Corporate control networks
3.1 Hierarchies of rms
A parent company can coordinate the management decisions of subsidiaries included in its corpo-
rate network. From this point of view, a corporate control network can be seen as a set of legally
autonomous rms that are under the corporate control of a parent company through shareholding
linkages. Reasonably, we can assume that a relationship of corporate control among otherwise inde-
pendent companies is: i) plunged into an ownership network; ii) based on a concentration of voting
rights5 detected on the web of interlocking assemblies of shareholders.
Eventually, corporate control networks are not the same as ownership networks, in the form we
introduce in the previous Section 2.
On the one hand, ownership networks include the case of portfolio investments, when shareholders
have an interest in the dividend distribution but not a long-lasting interest in the management of
the company. On the other hand, corporate boundaries exclude ultimate owners. In fact, individual
investors and public authorities are the sources of ownership networks and their ultimate economic
beneciaries, but they do not belong to the corporate boundaries established by the rms.
Briey, we can dene a corporate control network as a hierarchicy C, made of a parent and its
subsidiaries, extracted from an ownership network G. A parent and its subsidiaries are in a corporate
control relationship, h, in the form:
h : G(NG ;KG ; VG ;WG)! C(MC ; LC ; VC) (4)
for every G 2 
 and C 2 , where  is the space of corporate boundaries, i.e including all hierarchies
of rms.
In other words, the relationship h is an application such that from the ownership space, 
, we
extract the corporate control space, . In each ownership network there can be more than one
corporate network, not all companies have to be included in a corporate network. When a company
is not included in the corporate network, it is a stand-alone rms with no subsidiaries and no parent.
In this framework, the set of nodesMC is a subset within the ownership space, such thatMC  NG .
The characteristics of rms falling under hierarchies, VC , are invariant to any control application,
although this time the total equity value collected under hierarchies can be lower than the total value
distributed in ownership networks, such that
X
i2
vi 0
X
i2

vi.
In order to obtain hierarchies of rms from ownership networks, we need an application of corporate
control such that:
i) a unique parent company, ho 2 NC , which controls a set of subsidiaries and it has no superior6
in corporate control;
ii) no control cycle in the hierarchy, i.e., no company can indirectly control itself.
5On this we follow international standards. See among others, OECD (2005) and UNCTAD (2009). At this stage
we rule out as exceptional the possibility that corporate control is established on contractual terms between a buyer
and a supplier, or by using privileged equity shares with control rights in excess of dividend rights. Of course, having
information on the latter, it would be easy to extend our model to include these cases. Privileged voting rights, for
example, could be simply weighted for their real power in the assembly of a company.
6We adopt the terms superior and inferior to di¤erentiate the authority structure dened in a hierarchy, from a
dominance structure dened in a simple directed ownership network, where we nd predecessors and successors. In this,
we follow Gilles (2010).
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Both points dene the peculiar characteristics of a hierarchy of rms. The rst assumes that a
corporate control relationship must be binary, uniquely attributing subsidiaries to parent companies.
It has to tell us whether a subsidiary is controlled or not by a parent company, tertium non datur. It
implicitly states that any simple portfolio investment is ruled out from a corporate control network.
The second point assumes that we have to nd a way to untie bundles of ownership cycles (cross-
holdings, ownership cycles, and self-ownership) in order to understand which is eventually the parent
company on top of the hierarchy.
Eventually, a hierarchy comes as an unweighted graph, where no percentage is attached to control
linkages, LC . We will better dene the nature of control linkages as control distances in the following
paragraph.
3.2 Corporate control and interlocking assemblies
Corporate control is based on a concentration of voting rights. The simplest case is when a unique
shareholder has absolute majority in a company, but when ownership is fragmented a coalition of
shareholders is needed. In fact, building coalitions in ownership networks is complicated by the
presence of interlocking assemblies of shareholders.
Assemblies can be interlocking because a shareholder can have a right to sit at more than one
assembly, and because a corporate shareholder has to rely on the decision taken by its own shareholders
before taking a decision in the assembly of another company. Eventually, we may nd cascades of votes
in ownership networks, which are more sophisticated when cross-holdings and long vertical structures
have to be taken into account.
In this framework, we can consider any hierarchy of rms, C, as a collection of control paths
connecting nodes. This allows us to express a relationship of control h+ in the form:
h+(h0) =
n
i 2MC j 9 P (m)hoi = fho; hi+m 1:::; ; hi; ig in C
o
(5)
where h0 is the parent company and the control path has a generic length m. Any generic element
hi+m n, with n > m, is an intermediate controller of company i.
The sign of the mapping, h+, denes the orientation of the relation from superior nodes to inferior
nodes, as we assume that headquarters by parent company is where coordination of management
starts. That is, we assume that once a decision is made at the headquarters level, this is passed
along control paths. There can be more than one control path running from a parent and each of its
subsidiaries, with di¤erent lengths.
In this case, we dene the hierarchical distance of a subsidiary from the parent company as the
minimum length of control paths, in the form:
dhoi = minm
h
P
(m)
hoi
i
(6)
In other words, a corporate network has shareholdersassemblies that are interlocking and possibly
coordinate with headquarters, but they are ordered according to a relationship that we can consider of
partial order7, such that h0  hi+m 1  :::  i. In fact, there can be more than one control path with
the same distance from the headquarters. Also, if two companies exchange majority cross-holdings,
they can be considered one the superior of the other. It would be clear from following analyses how
a relationship of partial order catches the complexity of some corporate governance arrangements,
better than a strict order relationship.
7According to properties of partial order: i) any company can be a superior of itself (reexivity: hm  hm); ii)
if a company controls another and the latter control the rst, they are on the same hierarchical level (antisimmetry:
if hm  hm+1, and hm+1  hm; then hm+1  hm); iii) if a company controls another, and the latter in turn has a
subsidiary, then the company on top control both (transitivity: if hm  hm+1, and hm+1  hm+2, then hm  hm+2).
10
3.2.1 Transitivity of control and consolidation of voting rights
We assume that a parent company can extend its outreach on an ownership network in two ways:
i) by transitivity of control, establishing vertical structures, i.e. allowing subsidiaries to control
other subsidiaries;
ii) by consolidation of voting rights, summing up the shares held by its subsidiaries in other
companies to reach majority of voting rights in the latter.
However, the extent of a corporate control network can be unknown to the analyst at rst. In this
case, one needs a full picture of the interlocking shareholding activity among companies, to detect
and assign roles in corporate control networks. It was the case of Figure 3, where only a full mapping
allowed us to track the extension of control plunged into an ownership network. In Appendix Figure
B1 we report an application of the following methodology to the ctional network of Figure 3.
We proceed recursively, in the spirit of what proposed by Chapelle and Szafarz (2007)8, bottom-up
from ownership of single companies.
We start considering an oriented square matrix with all direct shareholding activity represented
in a network G, as the one in eq. (1), where each entry corresponds to the equity stake wsii, if si is a
direct shareholder and 0 otherwise.
Hence, we transform the original ownership matrix in a matrix A(1), whose single element is:
a
(1)
sii
=
8<:
1 if si : wsii > 0:5
0 if 9sk 6= si : wski  0:5
wsii otherwise
(7)
Briey, matrix A(1) identies all the immediate controllers (if any) among direct shareholders who
reach absolute majority in a company i, wsii > 0:5.
If an immediate controller is identied, any minority shareholders sk does not have a chance to
participate to corporate control and we simplify dropping their linkages. Otherwise, if no absolute
majority is detected, we keep the linkages of all the shareholders in a company i as they are.
Transitivity of control at upper levels
It is possible that a (corporate) direct controller is in turn controlled by another company. In
this case, we consider shareholding at an upper level with respect to company i, i.e. looking for
shareholders of direct (corporate) controllers. We build a new matrix, T (1), whose element is:
t
(2)
sji
=
8><>:
1 if 9 P (2)sji = (sj ; si; i), where wsjsi > 0:5
0 if 9 P (2)ski = (sk; si; i), where sk 6= sj and wsksi > 0:5
a0sii otherwise
(8)
where sj and sk are to be found among all direct shareholders of direct shareholders. All the
generic paths P (2)si of length two, reaching the company and starting from shareholders of direct
controllers, sj and sk have to be taken into account.
Consolidation of shares at upper levels
It is also possible that on upper levels we can consolidate to majority shares that are dispersed
among di¤erent (corporate) shareholders of company i, which actually belong to the same controller,
as in the case of Figure 3. We build a matrix A(2), such that each of its element is:
8Chapelle and Szafarz (2007) apply an algorithm similar to ours on already dened corporate boundaries, to assess the
power of companies inside the boundary. Our scope is di¤erent. We want to detect the extent of corporate boundaries
when these are unknown, given the information on raw ownership. In this case, we apply Banzhaf index after (not before)
consolidation of control, hence using power indices in a more conservative way.
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a
(2)
sji
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 if t(1)sji +
X
k: t
(1)
sjsq
=1
t
(1)
sqi
> 0:5
0 if 9 sl 6= i : t(1)sji +
X
l: t
(1)
sjsl
=1
t
(1)
sli
> 0:5
t
(1)
sji
otherwise
(9)
where sq and sl are to be found among predecessor of i on paths of length 1, i.e. its direct
shareholders.
From now on we iterate consecutively, looking always at a generic upper level m of shareholding to
detect transitivity of control in a matrix T (m). Then we look downstream at the generic level (m  1),
to detect consolidation of control in a generic matrix A(m 1). We nally come up to the point that
A(n) = A(n+1), which implies that there is no ownership path longer than n that allows to detect
either transitivity or consolidation of control.
At the end of the process, we know the extent of corporate boundaries, Cs, which are identied
by all control paths P (m)hoi = fho; hi+m 1:::; ; hi; ig with a (corporate) controller on top, ho. We discard
ultimate owners on top of parent companies, because they do not belong to the corporate boundary.
3.3 Coalitions of shareholders and control probability
So far, we have left out from corporate boundaries minority stakes, once assuming they represent
portfolio investments, i.e. the shareholder does not participate to the control of a company because
there is a well established control path starting from parent companies.
Yet we may nd still companies, whose ownership is fragmented, where (individual or corporate)
shareholders can form coalitions and pool together their voting rights to have an impact on the
management. Indeed, this is the case of quoted companies, where one or few shareholders can gain
actual control with just a minority stake, because all the rest of share capital is oating on the market
and fragmented among an ocean of small shareholders (see for example Nenova, 2003, and Rajan and
Zingales, 1998a). These cases are not encompassed by transitivity and consolidation of control as
introduced in the previous section.9
For these cases, we can extend the notion of corporate control adopting a probabilistic measure
comprised in a range [0; 1], whose limit value 1 is the case of a unique majority shareholder.10 There-
after, at the end of this section we discuss peculiar cases of coalitions of shareholders, which can shape
real-world cases of a wedge between ownership and control in companies.
3.3.1 The Banzhaf (1965) Index
We have an assembly of direct shareholders, Si, of company i that adopts a voting rule to reach
consensus on each decision. The preferred majority rule is binary, because shareholders are asked
to vote yes or no on single management proposals. We dene the outcome of each possible vote
in company i as r (Bi) 2 f0; 1g, where Bi  Si is a winning coalition, and the yes and no are
respectively proxied by 1 and 0. Conventionally, we assume that a coalition wins when its proposal
9Until now we followed international standards for concentration of voting rights above 50% by a unique shareholder,
with or without consolidation and transitivity. For an example of a more exible denition in international law, we may
refer to the Article 3(2) of the EU Merger Regulation, where control is dened as the possibility of exercising decisive
inuence on an undertaking, which can be acquired through purchase of securities or assets or by rights, contracts, or
any other means (see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_compilation.pdf)
10Please note how the use of a Banzhaf Index in previous works (Levy and Szafarz, 2017; Levy, 2011; Crama and
Leruth, 2007) is applied to already dened corporate structures in order to assess the distribution of control power
within the structure. Here we adopt a di¤erent perspective, as our scope is to identify corporate structures that are
embedded in ownership networks. In our case the Banzhaf Index is adopted after (and not before) consolidation and
transitivity in majority of voting rights, to attribute residually to a corporate boundary the rms that are otherwise left
outside any corporate control network.
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is approved (yes) by the absolute majority of voting rights (> 50%). The generic coalition Bi is
winning if:
X
si2Bi
wsii 2 (0:5; 1] (10)
The outcome of voting session eventually depends on the distribution of weights, wsii 2Wi, among
shareholders. For sake of completeness, we include among possible coalitions also the empty set, when
no agreement is reached (Bi = f?g), and the grand coalition (Bi = Si), when all agree on a proposal.
We are able to measure the control probability of each shareholder, (si), after the computation
of a Banzhaf (1965) index11 in the form:
(si) =
1
2jSij 1
X
Bi  Si n fsig
r (Bi [ fsig)  r (Bi) (11)
where jSij is the cardinality of the corporate assembly Si. The control probability, (si); falls in
a range [0; 1]. It is the probability of a shareholder si to exert the decisive vote, once considering all
the possible winning coalitions with her, Bi [ fsig, and without her, Bi.
A shareholder has probability 1 of controlling a company if she has alone above 50% of equity
stakes. In this case, any other shareholder would have a control probability equal to 0. When no
shareholder has absolute majority, di¤erent distributions of control power can be detected between 0
and 1, which are not linear in the distribution of equity shares.
3.3.2 Dominant stakes
As a consequence of eq. 11, when companies have fragmented ownership and nobody has outright
absolute majority, the power of one shareholder to inuence management depends also on the dis-
tribution of capital shares among the others. The more fragmented is the ownership among other
shareholders, the higher the control probability by one shareholder. Take for example the case of
companies that are quoted at the stock exchange, where one can obtain control with a threshold well
below 50% of voting rights. This is possible because a oating of stakes exists that can be distributed
among a mass of investors that is not able to unite and form a coalition. In general, we can say that
a shareholder has an inuential stake when its control probability is high enough, even when a unique
controller has not been identied.
Then, what is the threshold of voting rights after which a stake in a company is inuential? In a
probabilistic framework like the one given by eq. 11 there is no single answer.
In Appendix Figure B2, we report a correlation between equity shares held by a shareholder and
her Banzhaf index, as derived from an application of eq. 11 to the ownership data we are going to use
throughout the rest of the paper. There we nd that there is no linear association between the amount
of voting rights (on the x-axis) and the probability of controlling a company (on the y-axis), as soon
as no shareholder collects alone > 50% of shares. A variety of situations can be found, depending also
on the number of shareholders sitting at a rm assembly.
Nonetheless, we can reasonably assume that a shareholder is dominant when her Banzhaf Index is
at least higher than 0:5, i.e. her voting rights are determinant in at least half of the possible coalitions
in an assembly of shareholders.
11This index is also called the Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman power index. For previous use of the theory of cooperative
games in detecting shareholding and corporate structures, see the review by Crama and Leruth (2013). Two main power
indices are originally designed for horizontal voting models. The alternative is the Shapley value (1953) index, which
calculates the fraction of the possible voting sequences, in which a shareholder is decisive for the approval. Our preference
falls on the Banzhaf (1965) index as it is valid whatever the voting sequence. See also Dubey and Shapley (1979) for an
introduction to its mathematical properties.
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We consider the notion of dominant stake as just complementary to transitivity and consolidation
of voting rights in dening the extension of corporate control networks. We illustrate hereby some
peculiar situations that intervene to dene better some exceptional cases we can nd in real-world
corporate hierarchies.
A) A dominant stake can be held by a parent company and/or one of its subsidiaries on an otherwise
independent company.
By transitivity of control, we can assume that the parent of the subsidiary nally exerts its power
also on the company in which it and/or its subsidiary have a dominant stake. In the latter case, a
further coordination e¤ort is required between the parent and the subsidiary, which makes control
more disputable by other shareholders.
B) A dominant stake can be held by a parent company on another parent company.
Although rare, it is possible. This is the case of the Toyota Group described from introduction in
Figure 2, where eight parent companies were spotted. They have a complex cross-holdings structure
in each other. For example, Toyota Motor Corporation has a stake between 20% and 25% in each of
the other seven parent companies, while two of the latter (Toyota Industries Corporation and Denso
Corporation) have respectively a stake of 6.63% and 2.56% in Toyota Motor Corporation. Considering
fragmentation and cross-holdings, for example, Denso Corp is dominated in corporate control by a
coalition made by Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Industries Corporation, which respectively
control 22.25% and 10.32%, i.e. not an absolute majority of voting rights
C) A dominant stake can be held by a nancial company on an industrial company.
Financial companies may professionally invest in the equity of other companies, ending up with an
important amount of stakes in many companies, although they may be not committed in coordinating
the management decisions of these rms. Indeed, according to the level of commitment and depending
on the regulatory environment, a nancial company can act as an active or a passive investor. This
is for example the case of pension funds and mutual funds, which may become more active in case of
extraordinary decisions in the life of companies after exerting pressure on managers of the company.
D) A dominant stake can be held by an ultimate owner on a parent company.
In this case, the ultimate owner with the highest stake is the major beneciary of the activity of
the parent company and its subsidiaries, but she does not participate to the denition of the corporate
boundary by virtue of separation between ownership and control. She will participate proportionally
to the distribution of dividends, whereas her control probability in the company denes her power with
respect to the other ultimate owners. We can nd under this category for example family business
groups, when the equity is fragmentd among more than one member of the family. Take the case of
Tata Motors Limited originated in India, which is generally considered the parent company of the
group, although members of the Tata family in India own the conglomerate group with just a direct
share equal to 31.06% in the portfolio of a family holding, the Tata Sons company.12
E) A dominant stake can be held by an ultimate owner on an independent company.
The company is still independent, as it does not participate to any corporate control network, be-
cause it does not control any subsidiary. As in the previous case, any ultimate owner is the beneciary
of the activity of the independent company in proportion to the capital shares, but she will have a
higher power the higher her Banzhaf Index. This is the case of some partnerships, when individual
partners decide to share the risk of the business venture among them.
12The rest of the equity is distributed among professional nancial investors as Citibank, which is actually the second
shareholder with a share of 18.37%. Members of the Tata family ultimately endow two main trusts created by the family
founder with 66 percent of the equity capital of Tata Sons Company for philanthropic actions, the Sir Dorabji Tata
Trust and the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. We can easily consider the whole shareholding activity detected on top of the Tata
Motors Limited as alien to the productive corporate boundary of the Indian conglomerate.
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4 Data and preliminary evidence
4.1 Data on ownership networks
We source original information on global ownership from Orbis, a database compiled by Bureau Van
Dijk, a private publisher of business information, which collects shareholding activity on more than
53.5 million companies operating in 208 countries, which are active at the end of the year 2015. The
ownership information is originally retrieved from a variety of national and international information
providers (national registries, regulatory bodies), as well as from company annual reports, company
websites and specialized press.13
In Figure 4 we start from full coverage of the ownership sample and separate stand-alone companies,
i.e. companies that are not participated by any corporate shareholder and that are not corporate
shareholders of any other company in our data. These are companies that do not participate to
ownership networks. Nested in Figure 4, we end up with a subset of 10,294,391 rms14, which are
instead embedded in ownership networks, because they participate or are participated in capital shares.
Figure 4: Relevance of corporate control networks on total ownership - number of rms
Firms with
ownership
(»53.5 mln)
Participating to
ownership network
(19.25%) Included in corporate
boundaries
(13.30%) Subsidiaries (8.86%)
Parents (4.44%)
Stand-alone firms
Portfolio stakes
Among them, 3,184,147 rms engage in portfolio investment operations, because they are not
controlled by a corporate shareholder and do not reportedly control any subsidiary15. Their corporate
shareholders have only minority stakes, and/or they have only minority stakes in the share capital of
other companies.
Therefore, after the application of the algorithm proposed in Section 3, we detect corporate control
relations among 2,369,892 parent companies and 4,740,352 subsidiaries.16
13The ownership database has an internal application that assigns a so-called global ultimate owner (GUO) to a
company, on the basis of bottom-up tracks of direct shareholding. It is exible enough to look at single cases, when
changing threshold and criteria of control also let GUOs change. The GUOs may not be the true ultimate owners, as
one would expect in corporate nance literature, as for example in La Porta et al. (1999). Moreover, a full picture of
ownership and control networks require elaboration from original shareholding activity without any precedent elaboration.
This information is available to the researcher as originally sourced from international providers.
14The majority of companies not participating to ownership networks (62%) in 2015 is made of single
traders/proprietorships, non-prot organizations and other unlimited liability companies. Limited liability companies
that do not participate in other companies are also excluded (38%). However, unlimited liability companies can be
shareholders of limited liability companies and hence be present in the dataset.
15 In Appendix A we provide details on the denitions for rms and shareholders (subsidiary, a¢ liate, parent company,
ultimate owners) in line with international standards for national accounts.
16At this stage, we assume that one parent company uniquely identies also one corporate control network. Please,
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Table 1: Companies participating to corporate control networks. Geographic coverage and multina-
tional status.
Hosting economy All % Multinational % All % Foreign %
European Union 600,829 25.35% 111,522 55.41% 1,625,508 34.29% 387,006 51.44%
of which:
Germany 58,969 2.49% 11,261 5.59% 196,426 4.14% 64,405 8.56%
France 31,389 1.32% 6,650 3.30% 96,749 2.04% 26,631 3.54%
United Kingdom 58,138 2.45% 12,361 6.14% 285,286 6.02% 62,818 8.35%
Italy 40,555 1.71% 8,680 4.31% 88,091 1.86% 19,357 2.57%
Spain 34,600 1.46% 5,530 2.75% 103,454 2.18% 21,823 2.90%
United States 1,435,218 60.56% 22,511 11.18% 2,138,025 45.10% 63,220 8.40%
Russia 29,741 1.25% 974 0.48% 110,232 2.33% 50,541 6.72%
Other Europe 36,073 1.52% 14,089 7.00% 84,045 1.77% 22,441 2.98%
Asia 105,449 4.45% 19,142 9.51% 316,014 6.67% 99,624 13.24%
of which:
Japan 32,526 1.37% 3,259 1.62% 82,316 1.74% 5,214 0.69%
China 11,048 0.47% 2,995 1.49% 83,311 1.76% 35,983 4.78%
India 3,516 0.15% 1,501 0.75% 14,971 0.32% 6,775 0.90%
Africa 5,102 0.22% 4,169 2.07% 30,346 0.64% 17,088 2.27%
Latin America 30,058 1.27% 18,247 9.07% 83,227 1.76% 51,693 6.87%
of which:
Brazil 2,905 0.12% 342 0.17% 15,960 0.34% 9,443 1.26%
Argentina 600 0.03% 126 0.06% 3,907 0.08% 3,059 0.41%
Mexico 1,356 0.06% 322 0.16% 12,728 0.27% 8,132 1.08%
the Caribbean countries 13,023 0.55% 12,662 6.29% 21,684 0.46% 18,049 2.40%
Australia 58,788 2.48% 2,771 1.38% 136,189 2.87% 14,750 1.96%
Rest of the world 68,634 2.90% 7,847 3.90% 216,766 4.57% 45,992 6.11%
TOTAL 2,369,892 100.00% 201,272 100.00% 4,740,352 100.00% 752,355 100.00%
Parent companies Subsidiaries
In Table 1, we provide a geographic coverage of our dataset made of parents and subsidiaries. In
Appendix Table B1, we also report the geographic coverage and rm size details of the more complete
dataset, including portfolio investment. Throughout our analyses, we follow the procedure of Section
3 and we adopt the denitions provided in Appendix A.
In fact, rms of any size 17 are included. Overall, small rms represent 86.6% of the whole dataset
and 40.6% of small rms are present in US. Global ownership spans across 208 countries in our dataset
but, as expected, the most represented economies are the European Union and the United States, with
respectively a share of 38.4% and 36.2% of the total dataset. We have 7.8% of Asian companies and
among them Japan and China add to 40% in their continent. Russia has a share of 5.6% of the
entire dataset and 13.5% of the total in Europe. The less active geographic areas are Africa and Latin
America. Small, medium and large companies are well represented in ownership networks.
Numbers by country/area slightly change in Table 1, after we exclude portfolio operations. United
States host by far the highest numbers of both parent companies (60.56%) and subsidiaries (45.10%).
The United Kingdom and Germany are respectively the second and third country with the highest
numbers of parents (2.49% and 2.45%) and subsidiaries (4.14% and 6.02%). Asia is the third area
most active, hosting however only 4.45% of parents and 6.67% of subsidiaries in the world.
In Table 1, we further detect the multinational nature of corporate control networks. We consider a
parent company as leading a multinational enterprise (MNE) if it controls at least a foreign subsidiary
that is located in a country di¤erent from the country origin of the parent. As expected, in the
European Union we detect a higher share of multinational enterprises (55.41%) than in US for two
see section 3.2.2 for a discussion of peculiar cases, in particular when more than one parent company is present in the
corporate boundary, as in the case of the Toyota Group reported in introduction.
17A combination of criteria is adopted by original sources to classify a company by size: A) Large or very large
companies register more than 10 mln EUR revenues, or more than 20 million EUR total assets, or more than 150
employees, or over 0.5 mln EUR capitalization, or they are listed at a stock exchange; B) Medium-sized companies
register more than 1 mln EUR revenues, or more than 2 million EUR total assets, or more than 15 employees, or over 50
thousand EUR capitalization; C) Small companies includes the residual, i.e. they are not in the medium or in the large
and very large categories.
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reasons. First, there is a high level of integration at the European continental level, because companies
locate activities intra-EU in neighboring countries. On this respect, companies inside US investing
from one state to another are certainly not considered as multinational enterprises. Second, MNEs in
Europe are usually smaller in size than in US, and consequently more numerous in Table 1. In fact,
in US the average number of subsidiaries controlled by an MNE is about 12, whereas in the European
Union is only about 7. Nonetheless, the United States host the highest number of a¢ liates, of which
a great majority is actually controlled by domestic parent companies.
Around the world, we detect 752,355 foreign subsidiaries, which is about 15.8% of the total. More
than half of them are located in the European Union. Asia is the second continent with the highest
number of foreign a¢ liates (99,624), 36% of which is hosted in China. Among Latin American
countries, a noteworthy 2.4% of world share of foreign a¢ liates is attracted by Caribbean countries,
especially in British Virgin Islands, Bahamas and Curacao, well in excess of their economic weight.
Of these, many are peculiar cases of blurring nationality and round-tripping investment, as discussed
in following Section 4.5.
4.2 Ownership fragmentation and cross-holdings
We provide here some descriptive statistics on the fragmentation of global ownership and on the
relevance of the phenomenon of cross-holdings among companies.
Basic network indicators based on ownership linkages are reported in 2. In fact, ownership linkages
are the elementary observation units shaping the entire ownership space.
Each linkage can be represented as an oriented edge between a shareholder and a company. In the
rst column, the owership in-degree is essentially the number of shareholders by rm. In the third
column, the ownership out-degree is the number of capital shares held by shareholder. Columns 2
and 4, respectively, represent the ownership in-strength and out-strength, i.e.the weights of stakes (as
percentages) in each participated rm and as held by each shareholder. Please note how the category
of shareholders includes individual, corporate, and state shareholders.
Table 2: Ownership distribution: in-degree, in-strength, out-degree and out-strength
N. Shareholders
by owned firm
Capital share (%)
by owned firm
N. Stakes by
shareholder
Capital share (%)
by shareholder
(in-degree) (in-strength) (out-degree) (out-strength)
mean 1.75 66.46 1.56 43.12
5th percentile 1 20.00 1 0.32
10th percentile 1 33.33 1 1.13
25th percentile 1 50.01 1 10.00
median 1 50.01 1 50.01
75th percentile 2 100.00 1 52.95
90th percentile 3 100.00 2 100.00
95th percentile 4 100.00 3 100.00
99th percentile 10 100.00 8 100.00
min 1 0.01 1 0.40
max 2,050 100.00 10,618 100.00
st. dev. 4.59 28.77 12.12 34.06
skewness 73.06 0.01 389.07 0.40
N. firms/shareholders 10,294,391 10,294,391 8,197,736 8,197,736
N. ownership linkages 13,251,862 13,251,862 13,251,862 13,251,862
In Table 2, the median rm has only one shareholder and the median shareholder owns stakes in
just one company. However, both the distributions of ownership in-degree and out-degree show high
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skewness. After the 75th and 90th percentiles, respectively, there is a rapidly increasing fragmentation
of shareholding activity.18
Interestingly, in the right tails of these distributions we usually nd bigger companies. Bigger
companies have on average more shareholders, because the presence of a second shareholder correlates
with the probability that a company is three times bigger than one with a unique shareholder. Also,
bigger companies have more capital shares, because. the possession of a second stake in portfolio
correlates with the probability that a corporate shareholder is four times bigger than one with just
one stake.
On the other hand, if we look at the distribution of ownership in-strength in Table 2, we nd
that both the median and the average companies are owned with an absolute majority (50.01% and
66.46%, respectively). Ownership out-strength is relatively more fragmented than in-strength, because
an average (individual or corporate) shareholder has a 43.12% stake in a company. Financial companies
are responsible for keeping lower the average capital share, because they professionally invest small
stakes in equity of di¤erent companies to diversify their portfolio risk.
Nonetheless, we nd that about 1.9 million of rms in our data do not have a unique shareholder
able to exert absolute majority (>50%) of voting rights. In these cases, either a coalition of share-
holders as in Section 3.3 or a consolidation of voting rights in the form introduced in Section 3.2.1 are
needed to establish corporate control.
Interestingly, we can also assess the phenomenon of cross holdings, when two companies hold
capital shares in one another. We nd that 16,794 companies in 103 di¤erent countries are involved in
cross-holding activities. In Appendix Table B2, we show descriptives for the top 20 countries where
cross-holdings is detected. Unexpectedly, German is by far the rst with 4,956 companies, followed by
US at distance with 1,556 companies. Japan scores only third in the ranking, although the country
is usually considered as the principal case study for cross-holdings19 (Bohren and Michalsen, 1994).
However, all major EU members nd a place in the list represented in Appendix Table B1. Among
them, German companies present the highest average cross-holding share (93%), whereas Japanese
companies have an average cross-holding share of just 14%, the latter more in line with the goal
of establishing blocking minorities and/or cementing business alliances, rather than for exerting full
corporate control.
4.3 Corporate control and economic entrenchment
After transitivity and consolidation of voting rights20, we obtain corporate control networks whose
distributions is plotted in Figure 5. On the left panel we document all cases, whereas on the right
panel we report only MNEs.
We measure the size of control networks as the (log of the) number of its a¢ liates21, on the x-axis,
and we report the (log of the) count of how many control networks have that size, on the y-axis. If
we assume that Figure 5 underlies a negative binomial distribution, we estimate that (over)dispersion
is equal to 1.58 for all corporate networks in the rst panel, and it is 2.89 for multinationals in the
second panel.
That is, the majority of these objects has very simple structures, whereas only a few have so-
phisticated structures. In fact, on the left panel of Figure 6, we count 74.91% of cases made of only
two rms, when one parent company owns a single subsidiary (59.29% in the case of multinationals),
18The rm with the highest number of shareholders in 2015 is Rizo Consorzio Servizi SCARL, a limited liability Italian
consortium mainly involved in transporation and storage activities, with 2,050 shareholders. In the same period, the
company with the highest number of stakes in its portfolio is Dimensional Fund Advisors, an American nancial company
that manages assets for mutual funds. It owns stakes in 10,618 di¤erent companies.
19 In the same year 2015, the new Japanese governance came into force to make corporate governance of Japanese rms
more transparent. It probably acted already as a deterrent to reduce the phenomenon of cross-holdings.
20 In following analyses, we propose results excluding a¢ liates where parent companies have dominant stakes, due to
the possibility of double counting, when control probability is equal across more than one shareholder. However, main
ndings do not substantially change. Graphs and tables including cases of dominant stakes are available upon request.
21Assuming that each corporate control network is identied by a unique parent company. See Section 3.3. for a
discussion of peculiar cases of multi-parent corporate groups. See the case of Microsoft Corp reported in introductory
Figure 1.
18
whereas only 0.08% have more than 100 foreign or domestic subsidiaries. These are 1,934 groups of
rms, which however coordinate the majority of economic activity on a global scale. Indeed, they
account for more than half of the turnover produced in the total sample22, as reported in the right
panel of Figure 6.
In general, multinational activity is even more concentrated, since multinational groups are on
average bigger in terms of number of subsidiaries, while less than 1% of them explains more than 60%
of multinational sales.
Figure 5: Distributions by size of corporate networks
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a) All corporate networks (2,369,892). We
estimate dispersion (1+alpha) parameter 1.58
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b) Multinational corporate networks (201,272).
We estimate dispersion (1+alpha) parameter
2.89 assuming a negative binomial distribution.
Figure 6: Distribution of size and sales in corporate networks
a) number of corporate networks by size category
(as numbers of subsidiaries)
b) value generated by size category (as
numbers of subsidiaries)
22Turnover is present in less than half of the sample of subsidiaries. We may assume that smaller rms, in smaller
networks, can a¤ect our ndings on concentration. Nonetheless, our descriptive nding is robust to the exclusion of all
corporate networks where information on turnover is not complete. Still, we can conrm that less than 1% of these
objects concentrate around 50% of global sales.
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4.4 Hierarchical distance
The main advantage we have when adopting a network perspective in corporate control is the possi-
bility to observe paths and distances.
A parent company can be connected in many ways with a subsidiary, through one or more propri-
etary linkages at variable distance from the headquarters. More than one subsidiary can be present on
a control path. At the end, each middlemen subsidiary on a control path may have di¤erent charac-
teristics, which can explain why the parent company decides to go right through it before controlling
another subsidiary.
Paths can run across di¤erent countries, with di¤erent characteristics and varying institutional
frictions, therefore the classication by nationality of a rm, i.e. the identication of its origin country,
may be di¢ cult.
We rely on our framework, and specically on eq. (6), to attribute a control distance between a
parent and each of its subsidiaries, dened as the length of the shortest path through the ownership
network.Our denition allows to assume that companies want to minimize the communication costs
entailed in passing management decisions downstream from the headquarters. Ideally, in a coordinated
sequence, a decision starts from the parent company and is enforced rst by its immediate subsidiary,
which in turn pass it to subsidiaries of subsidiaries. If there is any crossroad on the ownership network,
the parent company will prefer to take a shortcut and reduce frictions.
In Table 3, we plot hierarchical distances of subsidiaries as an important measure to understand
the organization of corporate control in a hierarchy of rms.
An overwhelming majority of companies (78.6%) are located at distance one from the parent
company. However, middlemen subsidiaries and indirect control paths are detected in a non-negligible
21.5% of cases. In the case of foreign subsidiaries the gure of indirectly controlled a¢ liates goes
up until 53.7% of the total. For about 2,000 subsidiaries, we can nd more than ten middlemen
subsidiaries linking a nal subsidiary with its headquarters.23
Table 3: Hierarchical distance of domestic and foreign subsidiaries from parent company
Hierarchical
distance
Domestic
subsidiaries %
Foreign
subsidiaries %
All
companies %
1 3,223,182 84.991% 347,959 46.249% 3,571,141 78.578%
2 376,511 9.928% 186,062 24.731% 562,573 12.379%
3 123,021 3.244% 104,063 13.832% 227,084 4.997%
4 43,079 1.136% 55,414 7.365% 98,493 2.167%
5 15,354 0.405% 28,135 3.740% 43,489 0.957%
6 5,934 0.156% 14,182 1.885% 20,116 0.443%
7 2,518 0.066% 8,132 1.081% 10,650 0.234%
8 1,321 0.035% 3,765 0.500% 5,086 0.112%
9 600 0.016% 2,104 0.280% 2,704 0.059%
10 268 0.007% 987 0.131% 1,255 0.028%
> 10 580 0.015% 1552 0.206% 2132 0.047%
Total 3,792,368 100.000% 752,355 100.000% 4,544,723 100.000%
23As an example of extremely long control path, we report the round-tripping case of Europarks U.K. Limited, which
is located at hierarchical distance twenty from its parent company at the end of 2015. In fact, its control path crosses
the border twice, in Luxembourg and in UK, where we also found its parent company Bottom-up. In between, we have:
Europarks U.K Limited - Europarks Limited - National Car Parks Limited - National Parking Corporation Limited -
NCP Holdings Limited - National Car Parks Group Limited - Pointspec Limited - Statusaward Limited - Trendcycle
Limited - Primepanel Limited - PIHL (2003) Limited - Oval (2041) Limited - Oval (2042) Limited - Parking International
Holdings Limited - Parking Holdings Limited - MEIF II CP Holdings 3 Limited - MEIF II CP Holdings 2 Limited -
MEIF II CP Holdings 1 Limited - MEIF II CP Holdings SARL - Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund II.
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4.5 Blurring nationality
In Figure 7, we assess the relevance of peculiar cases of foreign subsidiaries, when the identication
of nationality of the company is not trivial, because control paths can cross national borders. The
problem is well known by international agencies promoting standards for foreign direct investment
(e.g. UNCTAD, 2016). they may have important implications at the moment of drafting investment
policies that want to discriminate based on investor nationality (UNCTAD, 2016).
Figure 7: Special cases: indirect foreign, transit investment, and round-tripping
parent
Origin country Origin country
Destination country
Destination country
Intermediate countr(ies)
parent
subs subssubs
subs
Origin and destination country
Intermediate countr(ies)
subs
subs
parent
a) Indirect foreign: 184,400 subsidiaries –24.51% b) Multiple passports: 144,161 subsidiaries –19.16%
c) Round-tripping: 10,001 subsidiaries –1.33%
As from our elaborations, we nd that 24.51% of foreign subsidiaries in our data are actually only
indirect foreign. That is, they belong to an ultimate parent company abroad, but indirect control is
exerted through at least one domestic middleman subsidiary. We report the estimates of this case
from our data in the rst panel of Figure 7. On the second panel of the same gure, we report
companies with multiple passports24, i.e. subsidiaries whose control path involves more than one
country before ending in the country of origin of the parent. They account for 19.16% of the total of
foreign a¢ liates in our data. A third peculiar case is reported in panel c) of Figure 7. A round-tripping
investment occur when the investor brings capital abroad in an incorporated company, then she starts
from there an operation that brings the capital back in her country of origin as direct investment
in another company. From our data, only 1.33% of foreign subsidiaries can actually be considered
round-tripping investment operations from our data. Main factors explaining round-tripping may
include the possibility to exploit o¤shore advantages in tax heavens, as well as a scant protection of
property rights in the origin country (see for example Ledyaeva et al., 2015, on the Russian case),
which requires shielding capital abroad .
Indirect foreign subsidiaries and subsidiaries with multiple passports25 are however relatively ne-
glected in existing literature, although they seem rather relevant from our data.
24Extracting randomly from our data, consider the case of Salo Optical Sdn Bhd in Myanmar. It is nally controlled
by the Salo Group SpA in Italy, although we nd middlemen rst in Singapore and then in Hong Kong.
25 In a recent document, OECD (2015) suggests reporting separately the case of special purpose entities (SPEs), which
channel investments (i.e. as middlemen) through several countries. Hence, SPEs are dened as entities that have little
or no employment, physical presence, or operations in a country, while holding assets and liabilities or raising capital
for the multinational enterprise. Actually, a cursory glance to our data suggests that only few middlemen subsidiaries
may be alleged SPEs, while most have non-negligible employment and may be actively engaged in economic activities in
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5 Empirical results
We organize econometric investigations as follows. First, we test the emergence of indirect vis à vis
direct control on a subsidiary, as the rst choice is the way parent companies start organizing pyra-
midal structures. In particular, we want to assess whether a parents choice is driven by institutional
environment and geography.
Second, once pyramidal structures emerge, we test whether institutions and geography matter for
running control paths between a specic couple of countries of origin and nal destination. Finally, we
test the choice of intermediate countries, as jurisdictions where middlemen subsidiaries are located.
5.1 Emergence of indirect control
We assume that a parent company can choose either to establish direct control over a subsidiary or
to coordinate the latter through one or more middlemen subsidiaries, i.e. through a corporate control
path with one or more predecessors in corporate control, following eq. 6. Eventually, if indirect control
is chosen, a parent embeds that subsidiary in its pyramidal structure.
Accordingly, we test the following probit model:
Indirecth0(co)i(ci) = 0 + 1Xco + 2Xci + 3Zcoci + 4Fh0 + 5Fi + "h0(co)i(ci) (12)
where the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if the parent company chooses indirect
control on a subsidiary, and zero otherwise. The sets of regressors, Xco and Xci , include characteristics
of the country of origin of the parent and of the subsidiary, respectively, with a focus on nancial and
contractual institutions. Among them, both metrics of nancial development and contract enforcement
are sourced from the World Banks Development Indicators and relative to year 2015. The rst is the
value of domestic credit provided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The second is the cost
required to to enforce a contract through the courts, as a percentage of the claim. Both measures have
been used frequently in other works to assess the quality of nancial institutions (see, for example,
Acemoglu et al., 2009, and Rajan and Zingales, 1998b). Other country level controls have been sourced
from World Bank, relative to year 2015. Specically, we control for the entry cost required to start
a business in the country of a subsidiary, as a percentage of income per capita. Further, we include
tax rates on commercial prots and levels of GDP for both countries of parents and subsidiaries.
Additionally, the set Zcoci collects bilateral gravity controls sourced from Head et al. (2010) and
Head and Mayer (2013), as updated to year 2015, with a specic focus on geography, economic and
commercial agreements, and common institutions between parents and subsidiarieslocations. Firm
size categories26 (small, medium, large, very large) are included in Fh0 and Fi. Standard errors are
clustered by parent company. We report nested results in Table 4.
We nd that it is more likely a parent chooses direct control in presence of good institutions
in its origin country, adopting a more transparent governance for its subsidiaries, specically in the
case of industrial groups.27 On the contrary, lower nancial and contractual frictions in the location
of subsidiaries more likely foster choices of indirect control, probably because parents are more able
to coordinate from remote the economic activities of subsidiaries. In this context, it seems that
institutions act as a push & pull factor. Depending on which side of the control paths we look at: a)
top-down, nancial frictions encourage direct control paths, from the parents perspective, when we
look at the origin countries; b) bottom-up, they encourage indirect control paths, when we look at
hosting countries of subsidiaries.
Our interpretation of results in Table 4 nd conrmation in analyses of following sections, when we
study the within parent choice of preferred destinations of indirectly controlled subsidiaries, and then
their hosting countries.
26See note 17 above for details on how categories are originally drawn in the Orbis database.
27Based on the activity of the parent, we consider as industrial the groups of subsidiaries that are not led by nancial
companies: banks, insurance companies, private equity, mutual and pension funds.
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Table 4: Emergence of indirect control
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Indirectly controlledh0(c0)i(ci) All All
Industrial
group
Financial
group
Financial developmentc0 .0006** -.0008*** -.0007*** -.0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0006)
Financial developmentci .0031*** .0026*** .0030*** .0005*
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0003)
Entry costci .0020** .0012 .0017** -.0031**
(.0007) .0007 (.0009) (.0015)
Contract enforcementc0 -.0027** -.0020 -.0042*** .0008
(.0012 (.0012) (.0014) (.0030)
Contract enforcementci .0054*** .0057*** .0059*** .0046***
(.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0010)
Profit taxc0 -.0026** -.0029** -.0044*** .0052*
(.0011 (.0011) (.0012) (.0024)
Profit taxci .0018*** .0014*** .0014*** .0012
(.0004) (.0004) (0004) (.0008)
(log of) GDPc0 .0565*** .0642*** .0600*** .0437**
(.0065) (.0064) (.0067) (.0192)
(log of) GDPci .0264*** .0381*** .0346*** .0650***
(.0038) (.0040) (.0045) (.0097)
(log of) geographic distancec0ci -.0185* -.0193* .0412*
(.0098) (.0102) (.0243)
Contiguous bordersc0ci -.2443*** -.2700*** -.1533***
(.0190) (.0213) (.0346)
Common languagec0ci .0411** .0610*** -.1533***
(.0175) (.0200) (.0346)
Colonial relationshipc0ci .0823*** .0824*** .0967*
(.0225) (.0254) (.0513)
Common currencyc0ci .1818*** .1728*** .1054***
(.0190) (.0205) (.0437)
Common legal originc0ci -.0985*** -.1054*** -.0679**
(.0142) (.0154) (.0323)
WTO membersc0ci -.0594 -.0216 -.2447
(.1032) (.0999) (.2230)
Regional trade agreementc0ci .0559*** .0252 .0439
(.0178) (.0190) (.0473)
Constant -2.4947*** -2.7379*** -2.5817*** -2.9370***
(.1565) (.1808) (.1846) (.5245)
Pseudo R squared .0251 .0293 .0329 .0273
Log pseudolikelihood -406,283.88 -404,562.31 -320,718.85 -74,199.48
Erros clustered by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of observations 604,785 604,785 478,432 126,353
Clustered standard errors by parent company in parenthesis ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
its choice of intermediate jurisdictions where to locate middlemen subsidiaries. In Appendix Table B3,
we try a robustness check limiting the analysis on domestic subsidiaries, for which the host country is
the same of the parent company. We nd that.the e¤ect of nancial frictions on the choice of indirect
control is statistically signicant only in the case of domestic companies owned by MNEs, whereas
no signicance is detected in the case of domestic parent companies controlling exclusively domestic
subsidiaries. The push & pull e¤ect of nancial frictions manifest itself when companies can choice
among di¤erent institutional environments, at home and abroad, along corporate control paths.
As expected, lower tax rates in the country of the parent discourage the establishment of indirect
control on any subsidiary, allowing for more transparency in governance. On the contrary, higher tax
rates in the country of subsidiaries incentive indirect corporate control. Indeed, we can reasonably
suspect that pyramidal structures, through indirect control, are established also to shift and hide
prots when taxation is too high.
Among other controls, we nd that geographic contiguity and longer geographic distances correlate
with direct control. On the other hand, it is more likely that bigger countries sharing a common
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language, a common currency and with a colonial common past establish indirect corporate control
relationships.
In the last column of Table 4, we separate nancial groups that are led by nancial parents
(banks, insurance, mutual funds, etc.). As expected, in this case, results are not robust and signicant
on institutions and taxation, possibly because their corporate governance is mainly based on the
possibility to exploit nancial gains, rather than on the necessity to coordinate productive activities.
5.2 Origin and destination of indirect control paths
From this section we restrict our analyses only to cases of indirect control in MNEs, to test which
combinations of countries of origin and destination prevails, after looking at institutional environments,
physical and political geography.
In the following equation 13, the dependent variable is an integer counting of how many times a
parent company h0 located in c0 has made the choice to locate subsidiaries in a country ci. It measures
the within choice of a parent company to pick a destination, given its original location.
Nh0(coci) = 0 + 1Xco + 2Xci + 3Zcoci + 4Fh0 + "h0(coci) (13)
Based on the nature of the dependent variable, we implement a negative binomial regression model.
On the right-hand side of the equation, we test the same determinants as in eq. 12, now excluding
only the rm size of the subsidiary, because now the information is more aggregated. Standard errors
are clustered by parent company. Nested results are reported in Table 5.
In this case, we nd that what matters is exclusively the level of nancial development of the
country where the subsidiary is located, after a parent has chosen to embed the subsidiary in a
pyramidal structure. In presence of lower nancial frictions, more indirectly controlled subsidiaries
will be located in a hosting country. This nding conrms that the parent establishes indirect control
preferably where it is easier to coordinate management decisions from remote. However, in this case
contract enforcement is to be not statistically signicant as a driver for location of subsidiaries.
Finally, we observe that the choice of a negative binomial model over a simpler Poisson model was
valid since the estimated dispersion parameter is signicantly above one.
5.3 Indirect control and the role of intermediate countries
At this stage, we test which features, among institutions and geography, drive the parents choice to
choose an intermediate jurisdiction along indirect control paths. We estimate the following equation
with a negative binomial regression model:
Nh0(cocmci) = 0 + 1Xcm + 2Zcocmci + 3Fh0 + co + ci + "h0(cocmci) (14)
where the dependent variable is an integer indicating the number of subsidiaries indirectly con-
trolled by a parent company h0 originated in the country co, which are organized on control paths
crossing (one or more) intermediate countries cm, before reaching destination country ci. This time, we
include a set Xcm on the right-hand side that is made of country indicators for intermediate countries.
Then, we add a set of gravity indicators, Zcocmci , for the multilateral characteristics of the countries
involved in the entire control path.
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Table 5: Origin and destination of indirect control paths, geography and institutions
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of indirect control pathsh0(c0 ci)
All All
Industrial
group
Financial
group
Financial developmentc0 .0001 -.0001 .0016 -.0025
(.0013) (.0014) (.0012) (.0023)
Financial developmentci .0049** .0033*** .0049*** .0002
(.0012) (.0011) (.0010) (.0016)
Entry costci -.0090 -.0088 -.0099* -.0115*
(.0064) (.0059) (.0058) (.0062)
Contract enforcementc0 -.0019 -.0037 .0003 -.0093
(.0069) (.0074) (.0054) (.0101)
Contract enforcementci .0013 .0015 .0057 -.0036
(.0043) (.0047) (.0044) (.0049)
Profit taxc0 .0002 -.0025 .0010 -.0060
(.0008) (.0077) (.0061) (.0117)
Profit taxci -.0080* -.0100*** -.0054 -.0124***
(.0041) (.0033) (.0037) (.0036)
(log of) GDPc0 -.0969** -.0685* -.0784** -.0373
(.0421) (.0385) (..3042) (.0521)
(log of) GDPci .2861*** .3204*** .3042*** .2782***
(.0312) (.0303) (.0345) (.0329)
(log of) geographic distancec0ci .0749 .0349 .1949**
(.0490) (.0663) (.0771)
Contiguous bordersc0ci -.1176 .0557 -.2954*
(.1644) (.1988) (.1689)
Common languagec0ci .0650 .0173 .2240
(.1330) (.1632) (.1403)
Colonial relationshipc0ci .3650** .1804 .8756***
(.1765) (.1942) (.2247)
Common currencyc0ci .3615* .1713 .6251**
(.2005) (.1597) (.2447)
Common legal originc0ci -.0312 .1968 -.5262**
(.1370) (.1360) (.2054)
WTO membersc0ci -.8252* -.0109 -1.1419**
(.4689) (..3540) (.5301)
Regional trade agreementc0ci -1954 -.0109 .6129***
(.1340) (.1573) (.1804)
Constant -2.173** -3.4750*** -4.0661*** -2.6452*
(1.0445) (.9367) (1.1201) (1.4690)
Pseudo R squared .0288 .0312 .0384 .0281
Log pseudolikelihood -1,373,088.7 1,372,756.5 -986,059.9 -380,433.11
Estimated dispersion parameter 1.7819*** 1.7547*** 1.7004*** 1.7128***
Erros clustered by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of observations 329,586 329,586 240,096 89,400
Clustered standard errors by parent company in parenthesis ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All characteristics, Xcm , of intermediate jurisdictions are averaged when there is more than one
country along the control path. That is, we calculate their average nancial development, their average
entry cost, their average contract enforcement, and so on. As a novelty, Xcm includes a variable that
indicate whether on the path there is at least one country that can be considered an o¤shore nancial
center, as following classication by international assessment.28
Among multilateral controls, Zcocmci , geographic distance is summed up to take into account
the entire route running from the parent country co, going through the intermediate countr(ies) cm,
and nally reaching a destination ci. The rest of multilateral controls are binary variables equal to
28We dene a country an o¤shore nancial center if it classied as such by both the IMF (2014) and the OECD (2016).
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Table 6: Intermediate jurisdictions along control paths
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of indirect control paths (c0-cm-ci) All All
Industrial
group
Financial
group
Financial developmentcm .0061*** .0049*** .0028*** .0060***
(.0020) (.0014) (.0010) (.0019)
Offshore financial countrycm .2666* .2975** .3924*** .2554**
(.1383) (.1126) (.1395) (.1356)
Entry costcm -.0134 -.0069 -.0314*** .0059
(.0165) (.0164) (.0091) (.0228)
Contract enforcementcm .0028 .0034 .0135** -.0102
(.0080) (.0069) (.0058) (.0097)
Profit taxcm -.0030 -.0054 -.0012 -.0106*
(.0061) (.0044) (.0048 (.0064)
(log of) GDPcm .2298*** .2538*** .2847*** .2137***
(.0416) (.0339) (.0362) (.0472)
(log of) geographic distancec0-cm-ci .2943*** .1806*** .2137***
(.0460) (.0448) (.0472)
Contiguous bordersc0-cm-ci .5415*** .4036* .7644***
(.1735) (.2199) (.1556***
Common languagec0-cm-ci .1599 .3024 -.2496
(.2008) (.2320) (.1603)
Colonial relationshipc0-cm-ci .4185* .3365 .6831***
(.2427) (.2778) (.2184)
Common currencyc0-cm-ci .4086** .3310** .5198**
(.1645) (.1315) (.2272)
Common legal originc0-cm-ci -.1361 -.0168 -.2899**
(.1014) (.1078) (.1359)
WTO membersc0-cm-ci -.2803* -.3230* -.3371*
(.1595) (.1734) (.1838)
Regional trade agreementcm-co-ci .4256*** .1420 .8589***
(.1234) (.1099) (.1871)
Constant -6.5708*** -6.6205*** -6.5552***
(.8440) (.9475) (1.2572)
Pseudo R squared .0202 .0292 .0348 .0302
Log pseudolikelihood -1,667,385 -1,625,354.3 -1,167,943.1 -449,763.44
Estimated dispersion parameter 1.8469*** 1.7477*** 1.7011*** 1.6815***
Erros clustered by parent Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin-destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of observations 397,645 390,883 285,406 126,353
Clustered standard errors by parent company in parenthesis ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
one if (all) intermediate countr(ies) on the control path verify a common condition, respectively, of
contiguity, common language, shared colonial relationship, common currency, common legal origin,
WTO membership, and they are all parts of a regional agreement.
The environment of countries of origin and destination is neutralized through the inclusion of two
sets of xed e¤ects, co and ci , respectively for the countries of the parent and of the subsidiary.
Parent size is introduced under Fh0 . Standard errors are clustered by parent company. Nested results
are reported in Table 6.
Interestingly, we nd that also the level of nancial development in intermediate jurisdictions is a
signicant driver of the parent choice in indirect control paths. This nding adds to previous results
shown in Tables 4 and 5, where we commented that parent companies prefer to minimize coordination
costs along control paths.
Nonetheless, ceteris paribus, we also nd that a parent company prefers an o¤shore nancial
center to locate a middleman subsidiary, probably due to the possibility to limit disclosure of its
nancial information and/or to gain from favorable taxation. The (average) level of tax rates on prot
in intermediate countries is not statistically signicant. Finally, richer countries, more distant but
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sharing a national border with the parent and the nal subsidiaries, are preferably chosen for the
location of middlemen subsidiaries.
6 Conclusions
As far as we know, our contribution is the rst to study the ownership and corporate control of
companies systematically, on a global scale, after adopting a basic network framework for webs of
interlocking shareholding activities.
First, we propose a simple generalization of an ownership space, which we imagine as the com-
mon playeld for all investors in the share capital of rms. Then, we introduce a model to detect a
concentration of voting rights iteratively, in the presence of pyramidal structures and cross-holding ex-
changes among companies. As a result, we can assign the role of parents and subsidiaries in ownership
networks, while separating corporate control relationships from portfolio investment operations. We
show that corporate boundaries can represent peculiar networks, i.e., hierarchies of rms, where par-
ent companies on top can enforce management decisions in downstream subsidiaries, which organize
themselves on di¤erent hierarchical layers of corporate control.
In general, we believe that our network framework is particularly useful to understand, on one
hand, di¤erent shareholding architectures around the world and, on the other hand, further dimensions
involved in the design of corporate boundaries, within and across countries.
In this context, we stress the role of middlemen subsidiaries, which are crucial in the organization
of pyramidal structures. These are companies that are controlled by a parent on top but in turn
control subsidiaries of subsidiaries on downstream lower layers of the hierarchy. As far as we know,
existing economic theory and empirics neglect both the emergence of indirect corporate control, as
well as the role of middlemen subsidiaries and their intermediate jurisdictions.
After we exploit a unique dataset of more than 53.5 million of rms, we provide some stylized facts
on the heterogeneous distributions of corporate control networks, aka hierarchies of rms, aka corpo-
rate boundaries, both within and across countries. After that, we test how nancial and contractual
frictions can a¤ect the emergence of indirect control relationships, as well as the geographic directions
of these relationships. Fundamentally, we uncover a push & pull e¤ect started by institutional envi-
ronments in MNEs structures. Less nancial and contractual frictions in the country of a parent drive
to more transparent forms of corporate governance, whereas less nancial frictions in the countries of
subsidiaries, including middlemen, permit a stretching of pyramidal structures and the establishment
of indirect control, possibly because a parent can better a¤ord to coordinate management decisions
from remote.
Ceteris paribus, we also detect a role for o¤shore nancial centers, as these may be preferred
intermediate jurisdictions for their lack of nancial disclosure and for their lower level of taxation.
We believe that our work paves the way to a variety of follow-ups. Once the network nature
of shareholding and control is known, we can study for example how the intra-rm trade of goods
and services develops on this network, probably at prices commanded by the headquarters, which
are di¤erent from market prices, initiating prot-shifting operations. Else, we can study if and how
corporate networks can establish internal capital markets, switching resources across countries and
industries on unsynchronized business cycles, as an alternative to costly resources on external nancial
markets. More interesting, it seems to us, is the possibility to understand if and how the concentration
of corporate control observed here also implies an increasing concentration of market power, raising
an issue of lack of competition that can be detrimental to overall welfare.
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APPENDIX A: Denitions
In Figure A1 we sketch a ctional ownership network, where we can spot two di¤erent corporate
boundaries, aka corporate networks. Assuming we were able to separate corporate boundary A from
corporate boundary B following Section 3, we can summarize here the denitions of Ultimate Owners,
parent company, subsidiary company, a¢ liate, and independent company that we use throughout our
analyses.
Figure 8: A stylized ownership network with two corporate boundaries.
Ultim ate Ow n e rs
(individuals, public authorities)
Parent
company B
Subsidiary 6
Subsidiary 9
Subsidiary 7
Subsidiary 10
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Parent
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Subsidiary 3
Independent
Affiliate
Co rp o rate b o u n d ary o f A Co rp o rate b o u n d ary o f B
Majority link (> 50%) Minority link (< 50%)
Subsidiary 4
Ultimate owners (UOs) are the shareholders (individuals, families, public authorities) that are
on top of any ownership path, because they cannot be owned by any other shareholder in nature or
by law. We can also say that they are the sources of the ownership space introduced from Section 2,
because they do not have any predecessor in ownership. In fact, they are the starters of any ownership
network as from initial decisions to invest in companiescapital shares. As depicted in Figure A1, we
consider UOs as on top but outside of corporate boundaries. See also Figure 3.
Our loose notion of UOs provided here does di¤er from a more specic legal denition of Ultimate
Benecial Owner (UBOs), which identies subjects that are for their actions ultimately liable in front
of the law. For example, the EUs Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (MLD4) identies an
UBO as a subject that holds more than 25% of voting rights in a legal entity. On the other hand, the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is an intergovernmental body participated
by 37 member countries, which denes an UBO more exibly as the natural person who ultimately
own or control a legal entity and/or the natural person on whose behalf a business is being conducted.
We argue that keeping our denition of UOs more inclusive allows us to catch better the variety
of wedges that can be inserted between ownership and control of a company, given also the variety of
corporate structures we may encounter (on this issue, see also Vermeulen et al., 2013).
A parent company is a company that coordinates the activities of one or more subsidiary com-
pany. It is not controlled by any other corporate shareholder, although one or more corporate share-
holders can sit at its assembly with no dominant stake.
We can consider exceptions the cases of parent companies whose dominant stakes are in the hands
of nancial intermediaries, like mutual funds or pension funds, which can operate as shareholders
but on behalf of their individual investors. In fact, the latter are cases where a distinction between
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ownership and corporate control can be murky, as it is based on the more active or passive role played
by institutional investors across di¤erent national jurisdictions and in the di¤ent moments of life of a
company. See also Section 3.2.2 for further discussion of peculiar dominant stakes in light of a control
probability framework.
A subsidiary company is a company that is directly or indirectly controlled by a parent company
through ownership linkages. In the case of direct corporate control, the absolute majority of capital
shares of a subsidiary is held by a parent company. In the case of indirect corporate control, one
or more subsidiaries already controlled by a parent company in turn control also a subsidiary of
subsidiary. Indirect control implies the arrangement of subsidiaries on hierarchical layers starting
from the parent company, as in Figure A1.
An a¢ liated company is a company whose parent only possesses a minority stake in the own-
ership of the company, while an independent company has no parent company at all.
Often it is a matter of degree of control, when ownership is fragmented, whether the balance tilts to
a parent company or to one or more Ultimate Owners. In Figure A1 we located an a¢ liated company
outside corporate boundary A, although we could consider it as included within a corporate boundary
when the parent (or one of its subsidiaries) is inuential enough on its management decisions, after
a dominant stake. See also UNCTAD (2009) and OECD (2005) on international standards proposed
for national statistics about foreign rms.
We believe that our probabilistic approach, after a Banzhaf Index is introduced in Section 3.2.2,
allows to catch every shade from outright corporate control by one parent to the case of independent
companies, when no unique controlling shareholder is spotted. Indeed, it includes cases when more
than one parent company can claim equal control power on an a¢ liated company, because for example
the a¢ liated company is on purpose established as a joint venture with equal voting rights shared by
investors.
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APPENDIX B: TABLES AND GRAPHS
Figure B1: From the ownership matrix to the control matrix. an application
a b c d e 1 2 3 4 5 6 a b c d e 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Starting from the original ownership adjacency matrix (A0) of the illustrative network of Figure 3, any jth node may
have a stake in an ith node. The coloured area is the sub-matrix of ultimate ownership, which does not change after
application of the corporate control transformation. Following matrices A1, T1 and A2 represent applications of eqs.
7, 8 and 9, respectively. Grey-colored cells show substitutions. No iteration is needed in this case: matrix A2 represents
corporate control in the given ownership network.
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Figure B2: Banzhaf (1965) Index, capital share and number of shareholders for minority-owned
companies
Table B1: Companies participating to ownership networks: geographic coverage and rm size
Economy Small Medium Large Total
European Union 2,920,807 713,176 323,924 3,957,907
of which:
Germany 536,578 138,180 50,170 724,928
France 101,064 76,576 38,558 216,198
United Kingdom 437,778 77,485 68,046 583,309
Italy 203,179 96,872 32,245 332,296
Spain 133,862 48,305 24,021 206,188
United States 3,620,543 45,067 62,494 3,728,104
Russia 437,180 105,822 34,367 577,369
Other Europe 228,161 64,132 20,802 313,095
Asia 553,644 116,435 131,578 801,657
of which:
Japan 118,195 27,931 30,774 176,900
China 99,942 10,874 34,595 145,411
India 17,032 4,738 8,990 30,760
Africa 39,750 2,151 4,475 46,376
Central and South America 121,580 20,159 17,752 159,491
of which:
Brazil 8,631 9,534 5,365 23,530
Argentina 5,358 1,174 1,432 7,964
Mexico 12,994 1,754 2,627 17,375
the Caribbean countries 41,662 141 1,676 43,479
Australia 381,878 48,311 10,211 440,400
Rest of the world 606,339 21,300 17,473 645,112
TOTAL 8,909,882 1,136,553 623,076 10,294,391
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Table B2: Top 20 countries where rms establish reciprocal cross-holdings
Top 20 countries N. firms Avg share st. dev. Min Max
Germany 4956 92.69 23.17 0.03 100
United States 1556 50.09 8.59 0.10 100
Japan 1493 14.09 13.24 0.01 100
Russia 1427 36.97 36.89 0.01 100
Spain 1123 49.77 37.26 0.01 100
United Kingdom 1016 72.29 39.19 0.01 100
Australia 960 58.94 38.85 0.01 100
Belgium 787 43.06 41.16 0.01 100
Italy 648 29.73 33.44 0.01 100
Israel 630 43.91 43.49 0.01 100
Portugal 587 33.99 34.19 0.02 100
Ireland 293 49.36 39.43 0.01 100
France 207 28.59 35.79 0.01 100
Turkey 162 26.01 31.09 0.02 100
Norway 146 42.11 39.60 0.15 100
Bulgaria 128 50.51 40.75 0.02 100
Romania 116 34.12 37.00 0.02 100
Taiwan 109 14.92 25.54 0.03 100
Netherlands 107 74.02 33.15 0.01 100
Poland 106 58.13 36.04 0.01 100
Other countries 1437 39.45 28.70 0.01 100
Table B3: Indirect vs direct corporate control in domestic subsidiaries
Dependent variable:
Indirectly controlledh0(c0)i(c0) All domestic subs
Domestic subs of
MNEs
Domestic subs of
domestic groups
Financial developmentc0 -.0006* -.0020*** .0004
(.0002) (.0004) (.0003)
Entry costc0 -.0120*** -.0327*** -.0014**
(.0021) (.0033) (.0005)
Contract enforcementc0 .0022* .0134*** -.0005
(.0009) (.0015) (.0009)
Profit taxc0 .0037*** .0005 .0052***
(.0009) (.0002) (.0009)
(log of) GDPc0 -.1505*** -.0114 -.1785***
(.0058) (.0121) (.0057)
Constant 2.2776*** -.6311** 2.870***
(.1307) (.2761) (.1422)
Pseudo R squared 0.3746 0.1013 0.2981
Log pseudolikelihood -964,026.55 -290,510.97 -649,983.6
Erros clustered by parent Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes
N. of observations 3,665, 804 474,897 3,190, 804
Clustered standard errors by parent company in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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